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LEGISLATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS:
WHAT LURKS AHEAD FOR BIFURCATION
I
PETITIONS for certiorari are strange and wondrous documents. At a time
when the Federal Rules have largely eliminated the technical mysteries of
pleadings,1 the intricacies of certiorari practice promise at least partially to
maintain that condition of lay incomprehensibility which is often regarded as
the true badge of a profession.2 Adept practitioners have, through a combina-
tion of empiricism and superstition, developed the precept that success de-
pends upon submitting but a few well chosen questions, though many be
available.3 It would seem, therefore, quite irregular that a recent petition
filed in a case dealing with the hotly disputed issue of shop-removals
devoted an entire page of argument to the proposition that since one of the
judges sitting in the federal court of appeals below was a member of the
Court of Claims the judgment of that court is without effect. 4 And the
Supreme Court obligingly granted certiorari, not upon the merits, but solely
to explore this issue.3 There is no suggestion in the petition that the judge
in question was not duly appointed and assigned in accordance with statute;
or that he committed any error in the proceeding; or that he was prejudiced
in the cause. Strange though it may seem to observers unfamiliar with this
arcane branch of constitutional law, the contention of petitioner which the
Court has chosen to hear is that because Judge Madden was originally ap-
pointed to the United States Court of Claims the subsequent act of Congress
under the authority of which the Chief Justice temporarily assigned him to
the Second Circuit 6 unconstitutionally deprived petitioner of its rights. The
argument runs as follows: Though Madden was appointed for good behavior,
1. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
2. [The courts] left it to the plaintiff to word his own demand; and when worded by
him, and worded at his peril, he learnt by the gain or loss of his cause whether the
wording of it was or was not to their taste. For themselves, they never thought
anything about the matter: it was for him to declare, and at the peril of loss, and
perhaps ruin, what those conceptions were, which, so far from having been declared
and made known, had never been so much as formed.
BENTHAM, Book VIII, RATIONALE OF JUDIcIAL EVIDENcE ch. XVI; 7 WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAm 277 (1843 ed.).
3. See generally STERN & GRESSmAN, SuPEmRE CoURT PRACricE 198-205 (2d ed. 1954).
(Co-author Eugene Gressman is court-appointed counsel for Benny Lurk in Lurk v. United
States, note 75 infra and accompanying text.)
4. Petition for Certiorari, pp. 18, 19, Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, Supreme Court of the
United States, October Term 1961, No. 242.
5. 368 U.S. 814 (1961). For a discussion of such limited grants of certiorari by the
Supreme Court see STERN & GRESSMAN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 154-55.
6. 28U.S.C.§293(a) (1958).
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to have an undiminished salary during his continuance in office, the Congress
are not required to afford him such tenure. They are not so required-though
they have declared that they are 7--because the Court of Claims is not one of
those courts whose judges are required by the Constitution to have such tenure.
The Congress-whether they believe they can or not-may therefore alter
Judge Madden's tenure or compensation at any time. The United States Courts
of Appeals, however, are courts whose judges are constitutionally required to
have such tenure, and litigants properly before these courts have a right
guaranteed them by the Constitution to judges whose tenure is not subject
to the will of the Congress.
Article I, section 8 (cl. 9) of the Constitution provides that the Congress
shall have power "to constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court."
And Article III, section 1 vests "[t]he judicial Power of the United States
... in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish." Section 2 defines this judicial power
as extending "to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitu-
tion, the Laws of the United States and Treaties made . . . under their
Authority," "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction," and to
"Cases" and "Controversies" between specified classes of litigants. The
Congress may choose not to exercise their power, or, in exercising it, not to
give the courts they ordain and establish the full extent of "the judicial Power
of the United States."'8 One might reason further that because the federal
government is limited to delegated powers, and because the delegation of
the power to create courts and the power of the courts so created is reasonably
precise, whatever courts the Congress do establish are limited to a range of
power no greater than that of "the judicial Power," and that they are subject
to the other strictures contained in Article III, including the requirement in
section 1 that, "[t]he Judges . . . shall hold their Offices during good Be-
haviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." But
such a seemingly reasonable conclusion would be at variance with repeated
decisions by the Supreme Court.
The first such decision was American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton:
Canter,9 where the proceedings of a special salvage court created by the
territorial legislature of Florida were collaterally attacked in the Federal
District Court for South Carolina. The plaintiff argued that the salvage court
could not hear cases "of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction" since the
Constitution reserved these for "one Supreme Court, and . . . such inferior
7. Congress declared the Court of Claims to be a constitutional court by the Act of
July 28, 1953, 67 Stat. 226 (1953), 28 U.S.C. §§ 171, 291, 292, 1491, 1494, 2508, 2510, 2511;
41 U.S.C. § 114 (1958). See H. R. REP. No. 695, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
8. See generally Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
9. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
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Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish" ;10 the
salvage judgment could therefore legally have been rendered only by one of
the two Florida Superior Courts created by the Congress. Chief Justice
Marshall, observing that the act creating the territorial government gave
Superior Court judges only four-year terms of office, held that neither the
Superior Courts nor the salvage court"1 were courts "in which the judicial
power conferred by the constitution on the general government, can be de-
posited. They are incapable of receiving it."'12 He distinguished two kinds of
courts which can be created under the Constitution. The first, or "constitu-
tional" courts, are those provided for by Article III and created thereunder;
the second, or "legislative" courts are "created in virtue of the general right
of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause
which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations, respecting
the territory belonging to the United States."' 3 These latter courts, being
created under the exercise of general legislative powers, are not subject to the
limitations of courts created under Article III. The Superior Courts being
legislative, the Congress could, as they did, provide their judges with less than
Article III tenure. And if Congress could create courts without reference to
the strictures of Article III, then they could also, as they did, authorize the
vesting of Article III admiralty jurisdiction in a court not created by them-
selves. "Although admiralty jurisdiction can be exercised in the states, in those
courts only which are established in pursuance of the third article of the
constitution; the same limitation does not extend to the territories."'14
This decision accorded with the Federalist view that the powers of the
Congress should not be construed restrictively.15 It permitted the Congress a
valuable flexibility in governing the territories, where all the judicial functions
performed in the states by the local judiciary were added to the normally
limited federal jurisdiction, and where the need for economy of manpower
often made it expedient to have the same men perform functions pertaining
to other branches of government. 16 Moreover, the fact that territorial status
10. Emphasis supplied.
11. The salvage court consisted of a notary and five jurors. 26 U.S. at 513.
12. Id. at 546.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. See, e.g., Hamilton's first plan of government submitted to the Constitutional
Convention which provides that "[tihe legislature of the United States shall have power to
pass all laws which they shall judge necessary ... to the general welfare of the Union."
Article VII, § 1; HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST 36 (J.C. Hamilton ed. 1871).
16. See, e.g., Act of August 7, 1879; 1 Stat. 51 (Re-enactment of the Ordinance of 1787),
the model upon which many territorial governments were constructed, at clause 5:
The governor and judges, or a majority of them, shall adopt and publish in the
district, such laws of the original States, criminal and civil, as may be necessary,
and best suited to the circumstances of the district, and report them to Congress,
from time to time; which laws shall be in force in the district until the organization
of the general assembly therein, unless disapproved of by Congress....
1962]
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was generally a transitory phase before statehood would create difficulties if
the territorial judges had life tenure. These grounds, whatever their strength in
1829, have a decidedly false ring today. The small number of remaining
territories are not apt to become states in the near future and even if they did,
their judges could easily be absorbed into the relatively large federal judiciary.
17
Moreover, the increase in wealth and in educated population can now support
the extra expenditure in manpower required by a functionally divided govern-
ment. Marshall's doctrine of legislative courts, however, not only has continued
to be applied to the territories, but has also been extended to courts created by
Congress with jurisdiction within the several states.
In Gordon v'. United States the Court held that the Congress under their
Article I power to pay the debts of the United States could set up a Court of
Claims, payments of whose "judgments" would be subject to action by the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Congress, but that the Supreme Court,
limited by Article III, could not constitutionally hear appeals from such a
court.' 8 The holding in Gordon that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction
to review judgments whose execution is subject to the degree of approval by
other government departments necessary under the statutory scheme in that
case, has never been overruled.19 The Congress, however, soon repealed the
provisions calling for executive action in connection with the judgments.20
And though this change did not transform the Court of Claims into an
Article III Court,2 ' the Supreme Court thereafter heard appeals from that
body.2
In Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 3 the Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ
of prohibition which would have prohibited the Court of Customs Appeals from
entertaining an appeal from the Tariff Commission. The petitioner contended
that because the Tariff Commission decision was subject to final review by the
17. Thus, there are now 301 district judgeships alone within the states and the District
of Columbia. 28 U.S.C. § 133 (1961).
18. 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1865); 117 U.S. 697 (Appendix) (1886). Due to the
death of Chief Justice Taney in 1865, the opinion was first published twenty years after judg-
ment.
19. The significance of this becomes more apparent when it is realized that every other
criterion for distinguishing between constitutional and legislative courts is either contradicted
by language in some later case, or-as in the case of tenure provisions-has become a matter
solely of conceptual signficance. See generally text at note 7 supra, and at notes 124-30
infra.
20. Act of March 17, 1866, 14 Stat. 9 (1866), repealing § 14 of the Act of March 3, 1863,
12 Stat. 768 (1863).
21. Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933) ; see discussion in text at notes
40-45 infra.
22. The first was De Groot v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 419 (1867).
See also note 170 infra and accompanying text.
23. 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
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President,24 it could not be reviewed by constitutional courts, of which, it was
claimed, the Court of Customs Appeals was one. The Court held that the
writ should not issue because the Court of Customs Appeals 25 was a legisla-
tive rather than constitutional court, and could therefore consider matters
other than cases and controversies. This holding was based upon a determina-
tion that the functions of the Court of Customs Appeals were not "inherently
or necessarily" judicial, but that such functions had in fact been carried out at
times by other branches of government. 26 Developing a doctrine of strict
bifurcation between constitutional and legislative courts on this basis, the
Court went to elaborate lengths to characterize as legislative other courts
exercising functions not "inherently" judicial; prominent among these were
the Court of Claims 27 and the District of Columbia courts. 28
In O'Donoghue v. United States29 and Williams v. United States,30 decided
ol the same day, four years after Bakelite, the Supreme Court had before it
questions certified by the Court of Claims in actions brought by three judges
to recover sums withheld from their pay under an act of Congress reducing
"the salaries and retired pay of all judges (except judges whose compensa-
tion may not, under the Constitution, be diminished during their continuance
in office) .-31 One of the two judges in O'Donoghue was on the Supreme (now
District) Court, and the other on the Court of Appeals, of the District of
Columbia.3 2 The judge in Williams was on the Court of Claims.33 The
Comptroller General of the United States had ruled in both cases that the
courts were legislative; hence, the judges' salaries were not protected from the
general reduction, and he accordingly reduced them.34 The questions certified
by the Court of Claims to the Supreme Court asked whether each of these
courts was subject to the provisions of Article III, and in particular whether
the compensation of their judges could be lawfully diminished.
The dictum of Bakelite was not followed in O'Donoghue. The District of
Columbia courts were declared constitutional, insofar as judges' tenures and
24. The proceeding was under § 316 of the Tariff Act, 42 Stat. 943 (1922). The
Court in Bakelite held that the ambiguous language in the statute did give the President a
right to review the decision.
25. This court became the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals by Act of March 2,
1929, 45 Stat. 1475 (1929), passed while Bakelite was pending. By this statute it was given
the cognizance of appeals from the Board of Patent Commissioners, which had formerly
been exercised by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
26. 279 U.S. at 458-59.
27. Id. at 451-55.
28. Id. at 450, 455.
29. 289 U.S. 516 (1933).
30. 289 U.S. 553 (1933).
31. Legislative Appropriation Act § 107(a) (5), 47 Stat. 401 (1932).
32. 289 U.S. at 519-20.
33. Id. at 555.
34. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. at 526-27; Williams v. United States, 289
U.S. at 559-60.
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salaries are concerned, upon two policy bases: 1) constitutional status was
especially necessary for those federal judges who decided the bulk of suits
brought against government departments, and who were in closest geographi-
cal proximity to possible pressures from those other departments ;3 and 2) it
would be unfair to the citizens of the District, who as citizens of Maryland 30
before cession to the national government had enjoyed the Article III guarantee
of federal judges with life tenure and undiminished salary, to hold that that
guarantee was lost when the territory was ceded. The Court found no difficulty
in reconciling its holding with Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co.,37 in
which the D.C. courts had been held capable of considering questions of an
administrative character. Rather, the court followed this pre-Bakelite decision 38
in interpreting Article I, section 8 (cl. 17)-granting the Congress authority
to govern the District-as giving to Congress not only all of the power which
they exercise over lower federal courts generally, but also all of the power
which a state legislature exercises over its own state courts. And since Keller
had held that the District of Columbia courts could be vested with non-judi-
cial functions, the result of O'Donoghue was to characterize those courts
as simultaneously legislative and constitutional .
3
The dictum in Bakelite was, however, respected and made the basis for
decision in Williams. The Court there admitted that the policies expounded
in O'Donoghue with respect to the D.C. courts were equally applicable to the
Court of Claims ;40 it felt itself incapable, however, of distinguishing the
Court of Claims from the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 41 which in
Bakelite had been characterized as legislative by a unanimous court, six of
whose members were still sitting.4 It felt itself bound, therefore, to character-
ize the Court of Claims as legislative, and its judges therefore subject to the
salary-cutting act. In so holding Justice Sutherland, who wrote both O'Dono-
35. [T]he judges of the [District of Columbia] courts are in closer contact with, and
more immediately open to the influences of, the legislative department, and exercise
a more extensive jurisdiction in cases affecting the operations of the general govern-
ment and its various departments.
289 U.S. at 535.
36. Id. at 540-51. That part of the District granted to the national government by
Virginia has been retroceded. Phillips v. Payne, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 130 (1876).
37. 261 U.S. 428 (1923).
38. Keller was cited with approval in Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 450 n.5, and at 454 n.14.
39. Hughes, C.J., and Van Devanter and Cardozo, JJ., dissented on the ground that
if some Article III provisions applied to the D.C. courts, all of the Article III provisions
must apply; a holding which would overthrow Keller and other cases holding Article III
strictures inapplicable in the District. 289 U.S. at 551.
40. 289 U.S. at 561-62.
41. Id. at 571.
42. The six were: Van Devanter, McReynolds, Brandeis, Sutherland, Butler, and
Stone, JJ. Only one of these dissented in O'Donoghue, see note 39 supra.
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ghue and Williams, was faced with the uncomfortable fact that the Tucker Act
gave District Courts concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Claims on
amounts less than $10,000;43 for while the dual status of the D.C. courts
discovered in O'Donoghue provided a conceptual justification for such con-
current jurisdiction in the District of Columbia, the Tucker Act was not
restricted to the District. Justice Sutherland, therefore, in characterizing the
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims as legislative was forced to approve the
power of the Congress to assign non-Article III jurisdiction to the lower federal
courts.44 Given the fact that the Supreme Court had long reviewed judgments
of the Court of Claims, 40 such a concession was hardly startling. It was some-
what incongruous, however, in a decision which so vigorously affirmed the
strict bifurcation doctrine enunciated in Bakelite.
Article III, section 2 of the Constitution extends the federal judicial power
inter alia "to Controversies to which the United States shall be a party," and
to Controversies "between a State and Citizens of Another State." This latter
clause was held in Chisholm v. Georgia 46 to allow suit against a state by a
citizen of another state in the federal courts despite the common-law doctrine
of sovereign immunity. One might expect, therefore, that the former clause
would be similarly construed to permit suit against the United States in
Article III courts. This analogy was recognized by the Court in Williams,
47
but Justice Sutherland refused to follow Chisholm,48 presumably because of
the repudiation of that case by the Eleventh Amendment. But the fears which
led to the passage of the Eleventh Amendment 4 9 -loss of state sovereign
immunity and subjection of the states to an increased federal control-were
irrelevant to the issue presented in Williams. And by refusing to follow the
logic of Chisholm, the Court rejected a ready-made doctrine for declaring
that the Court of Claims exercised Article III jurisdiction and was therefore
a constitutional court. 0 Yet in O'Donoghue the Court was willing to take
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1958).
44. 239 U.S. at 564-65. Tucker Act jurisdiction is non-Article III because the func-
tion of deciding claims against the government was held in Williams to be non-Article III,
the basis upon which the Court there found the Court of Claims to be a legislative court.
45. See text at note 22 supra.
46. 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 419 (1793).
47. 289 U.S. at 573-81.
48. Ibid.
49. See generally Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Justice Sutherland also relied
upon Hans to discredit Chisholm, 289 U.S. at 575, although it may be regarded as a construc-
tion of the Eleventh Amendment rather than a modification of the reasoning in Chisholm.
50. The Gordon case, of course, rested upon the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court (see text at note 18 supra), and so would not have been relevant.
The fact that the United States is a party in all cases before these courts is, furthermore,
the ground relied upon by the Congress in declaring the Court of Claims, as well as the
Customs Court and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to be constitutional in nature.
See H. R. REP. No. 695, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) (Courts of Claims); H. R. REP. No.
2348, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) (Customs Court) ; S. REP. No. 2309, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1958) (Court of Customs and Patent Appeals).
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the more drastic step of establishing an entirely new doctrine of dual Congres-
sional power-which blurred the very distinction Williams was attempting to
reaffirm-in order to declare the District of Columbia courts constitutional.
There were sound policy reasons for the O'Donoghue result, but Justice
Sutherland admitted that the same reasons militated in favor of constitutional
status for the Court of Claims.51 The conclusion seems inescapable, therefore,
that the Williams result was dictated solely by the existence of Bakelite.
Later cases were to make clear the price of this adherence to precedent.
Those who find the doctrinal situation somewhat confusing at this point
are in distinguished company. Justice Rutledge, writing for himself and Jus-
tice Murphy in National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.,52 spoke
of "the contradictions, complexities and subtleties ... in the maze woven by
the 'legislative court--constitutional court' controversy,"' 3 and advocated con-
tinuing what he thought to be an erroneous decision rather than "ensnarl the
general system of federal courts" in this web.54 In Tidewater, the Court found
constitutional an act of Congress which gave "diversity" jurisdiction in suits
between citizens of the District of Columbia and citizens of the several states to
all federal district courts.55 Justices Jackson, Black and Burton found the act
constitutional despite the fact that they-together with four dissenting Jus-
tices 6-- refused to overrule Hepburn & Dundas v. EllZey r5 7 in which Chief
Justice Marshall had held that the District of Columbia was not a state for
purposes of the Article III grant of diversity jurisdiction. s The three Justices
arrived at the result of constitutionality by assuming that the Congress could
either provide the courts of the District-created under Article I- with nation-
wide service of process or could create a special system of nationwide legisla-
tive courts with jurisdiction over state created rights in suits between citizens
of the District and citizens of the states.59 Given these assumptions, the question
51. 289 U.S. at 561.
52. 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
53. Id. at 604-05.
54. Id. at 605. The erroneous decision was Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 445 (1805).
55. Act of April 20, 1940, ch. 117, 54 Stat. 143 (1940), 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958).
56. See note 68 infra.
57. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1805).
58. Hepburn dealt with a congressional grant of diversity jurisdiction [Act of April
29, 1802, ch. 31, § 6, 2 Stat. 159 (1802)] made in substantially the same words as
the Constitution. It construed the meaning of the statute, however, by first determining
the meaning of the Constitution.
59. 337 U.S. at 585. This was, startlingly enough, conceded by the defendant. Ibid.
Though Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 421, relied upon by Jackson, (id. at
600-01), suggests that the Congress need not confine the effects of any local legislation in
D.C. to the District in the way a state legislature must confine certain such effects to its
state, Justice Jackson does not consider the effect the constitutional provision for equal
protection under the laws would have upon such a system of courts. And see HART &
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presented by the act was described as one of "mere mechanics of government
and administration. '"6 and it was therefore held by these justices that the
Congress-rather than running process nationwide from the District or setting
up a new system of legislative courts-could vest this non-Article III jurisdic-
tion in the District Courts.
Two dissenting Justices-Vinson and Douglas-agreed with the assumption
concerning Congressional power to create legislative courts,61 but held that
the case and controversy doctrine prohibited constitutional courts from enter-
taining a jurisdiction wider than that granted in Article III, a principle which
they refused to "sacrifice . . . on the alter of expediency. ' 62 This heroic
posture was somewhat circumscribed by their opinion, however, which sacri-
ficed all distinctions between constitutional and legislative courts, except for
the condition that the former could not be vested with non-Article III juris-
diction: a holding which involved a sub silentio overruling of the Williams
dicta.6 3
Justices Vinson and Douglas purported to agree with the other dissenters,
Justices Frankfurter and Reed.64 The latter pair, however, gave no indication
that they would find a power in the Congress to create legislative courts as
the plurality and Justices Vinson and Douglas assumed. Indeed, the basis of
their opinion was that Article III limitations were essential to the distribu-
tion of powers in the federal government. And since a legislative court system
created without regard to Article III limitations would alter the distribution of
powers, it is probable that Justices Frankfurter and Reed would have held such a
system unconstitutional.65
This view concerning the importance of the "case and controversy" re-
quirements was shared by the two concurring Justices, Rutledge and Murphy,
who found that the views of the plurality of three and Justices Vinson and
Douglas resulted in "what is a limitation imposed on the federal courts gener-
ally [being] none when Congress decides to disregard it by purporting to act
WEcHsLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 372 (1953), who ask "Once
these concessions were accepted, what was left to argue about?"
60. 337 U.S. at 585.
61. Id. at 644.
62. Id. at 645.
63. See text at note 44 supra.
In a footnote Chief Justice Vinson argues that the discussion in Williams about cases
"to which the United States shall be a party" was irrelevant to that decision, apparently for
the purpose of implying that district court jurisdiction over Tucker Act claims is constitu-
tional in nature. 337 U.S. at 640 n.20.
64. 337 U.S. at 626. But Justices Frankfurter and Reed did not indicate that they
agreed with Justices Vinson and Douglas.
65. See id. at 651, 652.
Justice Frankfurter did not, however, indicate how he and Justice Reed would deal with
nation-wide service of process from the D.C. Courts. For some of the problems involved
in this latter alternative, see note 59 supra.
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under some other authorization. '66 They held, however, that Hepburn & Dun-
das v. ElIzey should be overruled and the act held constitutional, pointing out
that the result reached by Justices Jackson, Black, and Burton would in any case
deny effect to that decision.67
Thus, each of the two bases for constitutionality had a majority of the
Justices opposed to it. The proposition that the District of Columbia was a
State for purposes of Article III diversity jurisdiction lost by seven votes to
two, 68 and the proposition that the Congress could vest district courts out-
side the District of Columbia with the functions of a legislative court lost
by six votes to three.69 The law was held to be constitutional, however, be-
cause both the plurality of three and the two concurring Justices had said that
it was.
70
II
Perhaps the clearest conclusion which could be drawn from Tidewater was
that ample room remained for future litigation. Comes now Benny Lurk,
tried and convicted of robbery in the District Court for the District of Colum-
bia. Lurk petitioned the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia for
leave to appeal in forma pauperis; when leave was denied without opinion 71
he petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. 72 Two grounds were presented
by the petitioner. The first, an evidentiary question involving prejudice was re-
garded by at least three members of the Supreme Court,73 and by the Court
66. 337 U.S. at 605.
67. Id. at 626.
68. Jackson, Black, and Burton, JJ.; Vinson, C.J. and Douglas, J.; and Frankfurter
and Reed, JJ. opposed. Rutledge and Murphy, JJ. in favor.
69. Rutledge and Murphy, JJ.; Vinson, C.J. and Douglas, J.; and Frankfurter and
Reed, JJ. opposed. Jackson, Black, and Burton, JJ. in favor.
70. Subsequent to the decision in Tidewater, courts of appeals have held that Congress
could constitutionally bestow diversity jurisdiction between citizens of the territories and
citizens of the states upon the regular district courts. Siegmund v. General Commodities
Corp., 175 F.2d 952 (9th Cir. 1949) (Hawaii) ; Detres v. Lions Building Corp., 234 F.2d
596 (7th Cir. 1956) (Puerto Rico). The Court of Appeals in Siegmund, quoted with ap-
proval in Detres, found that:
The reasons assigned by the two groups of Justices who concurred in the result
[in Tidewater] are as applicable to cases involving citizens of territories as they are
to cases in which citizens of the District of Columbia are parties.
175 F.2d at 952-53; 234 F.2d at 603. The argument that the reasons assigned by Justices
Rutledge and Murphy (made in 175 F.2d at 954) were applicable to the territories is, at
best, difficult to maintain.
71. By a three judge panel of the Court of Appeals, order entered on September 23,
1960. The order is not reported. Brief for the United States, pp. 1, 9, 10, Lurk v. United
States, 365 U.S. 802 (1961).
72. Certiorari was granted. 365 U.S. 802 (1961).
73. Justice Frankfurter, writing for himself and Justices Harlan and Stewart in the
dissent from the remand order, called it "plainly frivolous," and stated that, "It would not
justify an appeal in forma pauperis." 366 U.S. 712, 713 (1961).
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of Appeals on remand,7 4 as insubstantial. The second ground, however, was
that the trial below was void because conducted by a judge of the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals-and a retired one at that. Certiorari was grant-
ed, and the case was remanded, per curiant, to the Court of Appeals, with
directions to hear the appeal. 75 Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, and Stewart
dissented from the remand on the ground that the substantial questions pre-
sented could not be clarified by the Court of Appeals and should therefore
immediately be decided by the Supreme Court itself.76
Upon remand, the Court of Appeals became the first court to consider the
constitutionality of Congressional attempts to overrule the strict bifurcation
doctrine announced in Bakelite. Over the past decade, the Congress have en-
acted statutes declaring that the Court of Claims,77 the Customs Court,78 and
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 79 are constitutional courts and have
included their judges in the comprehensive scheme for temporary assign-
ment to any federal courts where they may be needed.80 The Congress have
also provided that judges of these courts may retire from active service under
provisions generally applicable to the federal judiciary.8 ' They may thereupon
be denominated "senior judges," receive their same undiminishable salary,
and perform such judicial duties in any court of the United States as they may
be willing and able to undertake, and to which they are assigned from year
to year by the Chief Justice. 2 None of the acts, however, limited or altered
in any way the jurisdiction or powers conferred by law upon what were, prior
to these enactments, legislative courts. The Congress had granted life tenure
to legislative court judges long before the acts in question, 83 but as the
holding in Williams indicated, their salaries-unlike those of constitutional
judges-were subject to diminution. 84 Given the inability of any Congress to
bind their successors, the statutory grant of life tenure was regarded as provid-
74. 296 F.2d 360,361 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
75. 366 U.S. 712 (1961).
76. Nothing could be more obvious than that the Court of Appeals, no matter how it
may decide the question now put in its keeping, will have it only temporarily. The
inevitable final destination of the case is this Court.
366 U.S. 712, 714 (1961).
77. Act of July 28, 1953, ch. 253, 67 Stat. 226 (1953), 28 U.S.C. § 171 (1958).
78. Act of July 14, 1956, ch. 589, 70 Stat. 532 (1956), 28 U.S.C. § 251 (1958).
79. Act of August 25, 1958; 72 Stat. 848 (1958), 28 U.S.C. § 211 (1958).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 293 (1958).
81. 28 U.S.C. §§ 371, 372 (1958).
82. Act of August 25, 1958, 72 Stat. 848 (1958), 28 U.S.C. § 294 (1958).
83. See, e.g., Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 441 (1929).
See, however, Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501 (1925), which, as interpreted in Bakelite,
279 U.S. at 455, might be regarded as holding the salary of a Court of Claims judge to be
undiminishable by a general tax, though later the specific enactment in Williams v. United
States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933) (note 31 supra) succeeded in effecting a diminution.
84. See text at note 40 supra.
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ing less of a safeguard than a constitutional one.8 5 Consequently, congressional
attempts to rectify these difficulties by a simple declaration denominating former-
ly legislative courts Article III bodies raise serious conceptual problems-prob-
lems which confronted the Court of Appeals in Lurk in its attempt to construe
the act governing the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
Thus, if Bakelite is still authority for the proposition that the functions per-
formed by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are legislative in nature,80
then the congressional enactment cannot be upheld consonantly with the
express holding in that case that the classification of federal courts-congres-
sional intent to the contrary notwithstanding--depends solely upon the func-
tions performed by any given court.87 Because the enactment in question
leaves the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' functions unchanged, in
other words, the fact that the Congress has now made clear its intent that the
court be classified as constitutional cannot alone be sufficient to compel an
Article III classification unless Bakelite's characterization of those functions
is now overruled. 88
If, however, the "legislative" characterization propounded in Bakelite and
strongly re-affirmed by dicta in Williams 89 is overruled, and the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals is regarded as having been a constitutional court
from its inception, then the effect of the congressional enactment would
simply be explicitly to affirm an existing situation. Such an interpretation is
suggested by the fact that the judges involved continued to sit without ex-
pressing a desire for or receiving those new found appointments which would
appear to have been necessary if the act in fact had effectuated a change in
status.90 Nor would such a characterization necessarily involve a renunciation
of the Gordon decision, which held that Article III limited constitutional
courts to cases and controversies in which their decisions were unreviewable
by other governmental departments,91 for the great bulk of the customs and
patent decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals cannot be re-
viewed either by Congress or the Executive.92 And even if an attempt is made
85. See, e.g., 279 U.S. at 459, 460; Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 Hav. L. REv.
894,895 (1930).
86. Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. at 458-59.
87. Id. at 459, 460.
88. For a suggestion to this effect, see Comment, The Distinction Between Legislative
and Constitutional Courts and Its Effect on Judicial Assignment, 62 COLUIX. L. x.Ev. 133,
159 (1962).
89. 289 U.S. at 571.
90. And such an interpretation would also serve to rationalize the Supreme Court's
long standing practice of reviewing the decisions of this court.
91. Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697 (1865) ; discussed in text at notes 18-22
supra.
92. The Supreme Court has never granted certiorari to the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals in decisions of that court rendered in patent and trademark cases, though
these decisions are clearly made with finality. See Comment, The Distinction between
Legislative and Constitutional Courts and Its Effect on Judicial Assignment, 62 COLUm L.
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to adhere to the strict bifurcation doctrine announced in Bakelite, the fact that
a small number of tariff decisions are reviewable by the President 93 by no
means compels the conclusion that the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
is a legislative court. Thus, it is still possible for the Court-consistently with
the bifurcation doctrine-to reverse the particular result reached in Bakelite
by assuming that the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals is a constitutional
court, and then concluding-consistently with Gordon-that such a court can-
not render those decisions which are reviewable by the President.9"
Even if Bakelite's characterization of the functions performed by the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals as legislative is approved, the congression-
al enactment could still be upheld if the test of function propounded
in Bakelite were discarded. Such an abandonment could be justified by sub-
sequent cases that have considerably blurred the strict distinctions which
Bakelite attempted to impose. Thus in Williams the Court approved the
concurrent jurisdiction exercized by the Court of Claims and the federal
district courts without requiring a change in the characterization of either.95
Similarly, five Justices in Tidewater thought that the Congress could vest
legislative courts with Article III judicial power.96 Finally, the concessions
made by the plurality of three in Tidewater appear to justify an overruling of
the Bakelite test on the grounds that the Congress are capable of assigning
legislative functions to Article III courts. The plurality of three, in other
words, would have extended the O'Donoghue assertion that the Congress
exercise dual powers over courts located in the District of Columbia to the
inferior federal courts generally :97 Once this assertion is thus accepted, any
such court may be either legislative or constitutional depending solely on
whether the Congress intended to act under Article I or Article III. But six
Justices in Tidewater vigorously opposed this last assertion.9" And more im-
portant-as two of the six made abundantly clear-such a holding might go far,
REv. 133, 164-65 (1961). Though the Court has suggested in some denials of certiorari that
it believes these cases to be non-final, it has not done so in others, and it is by no means
clear that the Court has not denied these petitions simply because it does not have the
statutory grant to issue certiorari in these cases or because it just is not interested in these
matters. Ibid.; ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SuPREME CoURT OF THE
UNITED STATES § 227 (1936).
93. Under § 316 of the Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858 (1922).
94. Due to the ambiguous statutory language, such a holding would have been possible
even in Bakelite itself. See note 24 supra.
95. 289 U.S. at 565. See text at note 44 supra.
96. Vinson, C.J. and Douglas, J., 337 U.S. at 644; Jackson, Black, and Burton, J3.,
337 U.S. at 590. The view of the trio may be adduced from the assumption they make that
Congress can discharge its duties, presumably including its Article III (according to
O'Donoghue) duties, to the citizens of the District by means of a nationwide system of
legislative courts.
97. See text at notes 59-60 supra.
98. See note 69 supra.
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if unqualified, towards removing Article III from the list of operative constitu-
tional provisions.99
The test adopted by the plurality in Tidewater, which is based wholly upon
congressional intent, could be utilized in Lurk to justify the assertion that the
Congress had the power to change the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
from a legislative to a constitutional body. Even under that test, however,
constitutional and legislative courts would remain distinguishable in terms of
the differences between constitutional and statutory tenure.10 0 Thus, assuming
that the Congress had the power to pass the acts in question, a metaphysical
explanation is required to demonstrate how legislative judges came to be ap-
pointed to the new constitutional offices which were created at the time the
enactments were passed.
Although the enactments are predictably silent on this question, they could
nevertheless be interpreted impliedly to have appointed the legislative judges
then sitting to the new Article III offices. But Article III judges had always
theretofore been appointed by the President by and with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate. Consequently, under this interpretation, the enactments
must be read not only to have created new Article III positions, but simul-
taneously to have enacted a novel method of appointment to those positions.
Such an interpretation could be argued for, however, on the basis of Article
II, section 2 (cl. 2) of the Constitution, which authorizes the Congress and
the President to vest the power of appointing "inferior officers" in the Presi-
dent alone, or in the courts of law. Thus, assuming that judges of inferior
federal courts may properly be regarded as such "inferior officers,"'' 1 the
Congress and the President must have sufficient power, whenever acting to-
gether-as they were in passing these enactments-to make such appointments
directly rather than through the medium of the President alone.' 0 2 Further-
more, since the Constitution explicitly authorizes the Congress to grant such
appointing power to the courts of law, judges who had retired prior to the
date of the enactments-a situation presented in the Lurk case--could be
said to have been validly appointed on the theory that the Congress has in
effect authorized the Chief Justice of the United States to appoint such "in-
99. Frankfurter and Reed, JJ., 337 U.S. at 651, 652.
100. See generally note 85 supra.
101. See generally Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision, and Removal-
Some Possibilities Under the Constitution, I, 28 MicHi. L. REv. 485, 499 (1930).
102. Compare this with the treaty-making power exercised by the President and 23
of the Senate, and with that exercised by the President and simple majorities of each house
of the Congress. See in this respect McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Execu-
tive or Presidential Agreements: Inter-Changeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE
L.J. 181-351, 534-615 (1945), reprinted in McDouGAL AND AssocIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD
PUBuLC ORDER 404-717 (1960).
But see Comment, The Distinction Between Legislative and Constitutional Courts and Its
Effect on Judicial Assignment, 62 COLum. L. REv. 133, 167 (1962) ; but cf. United States
v. Ferreira, note 137 infra.
[Vol. 71:979
BIFURCATION
ferior officers" from the ranks of retired judges of what were formerly
legislative courts.
103
Even if the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals is held to be a legislative
court, the provisions for integrating its judges with the federal judiciary
generally can still be upheld by judicious verbal juggling. Thus, the Congress
could be held to have given the Chief Justice of the United States power to
appoint "inferior officers" from among the judges of legislative courts; upon
this appointment in accordance with the Constitution such judges must attain
constitutional status regarding tenure and salary. And such "constitutional"
judges would, of course, be able to sit upon legislative as well as constitutional
courts-just as Article III judges have in the past been assigned to non-
Article III courts 04 --since their "constitutional" halos would presumably
survive any return to a legislative court.
However the enactments which attempt to overrule Bakelite are construed,
the basic problem still remains whether the Congress and the President may
themselves change a classification which the Supreme Court in Bakelite at-
tempted to root directly in the Constitution. Certainly the received learning
would regard the simple citation of Marbury v. Madison 10 5 as the definitive
answer to any such question. Constitutional judges require constitutional
tenure."' And if the Congress-because of an inability to bind future Congresses
103. If tenure means the right to continue to perform duties as well as to collect
salaries, the senior judges who are appointed for limited periods by their chief judge or
by the Chief Justice, but who do not have to be given any such appointments at all, even
if they desire them, do not have tenure for good behavior. Certainly the nature of their
tenure is different in this respect from that of ordinary district judges, for example.
Neither Booth v. United States, 291 U.S. 339 (1934), which holds the salaries of such
judges constitutionally protected under the statute involved in Williams and O'Donoghue,
nor United States v. Moore, 101 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 664 (1939),
which denominates such tenure as constitutional against attack by a litigant, considers the
possibility that a senior judge might be refused assignment to a court. Upholding the
constitutionality of senior judges' tenure helps to maintain the delicate compromise which is
designed to encourage superannuated judges who may still be capable of some service-and
in any event are too proud to admit they are not-to withdraw gracefully from the strain
of full time work. This benefits litigants by not giving them overworked, overage judges;
at least when they are aged, under this program, they should not be overworked.
Since a judge need not retire at all, however, once he does take the step of retiring and
entering his name upon the roster of senior judges willing to perform further duties as
able and required, he is very unlikely to be acting in fear of not being assigned to any
court in the future if his actions are disapproved; if he had had such fears, he never would
have retired in the first place. His salary is guaranteed in any event, and as long as he
maintains his name on the roster, the guarantee may be regarded as a constitutional as well
as a legislative one.
104. E.g., the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act ch. 6, § 29, 36, Stat. 105-08 (1909), creating
the Court of Customs Appeals, provided in paragraph 12 for temporary appointment of
district and circuit judges to that court. But cf. United States v. Ferreira, note 137 infra.
105. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
106. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933).
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-are in fact incapable of granting constitutional tenure to legislative judges,
then the present enactments simply reaffirm the prior statutory tenure, which
Williams held insufficient to create Article III status. If, however, as several
Justices in Tidewater claimed, the entire problem is solely one of "mere
mechanics of government and administration,"' 0 7 then clearly the invocation of
Marbury v. Madison would be irrelevant. It would appear, therefore, that
what was called for upon the Supreme Court's remand of the Lurk case was a
decision which, eschewing doctrinal subtleties, attempted to evaluate the opera-
tive consequences of what the Congress were attempting to do, and on this
basis to decide whether the question presented was one of constitutional
power or of administrative mechanics.
This the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, sitting en bane,
refused to do.' 08 Rather, it construed the act in question in light of the
O'Donoghue holding that District of Columbia courts could perform non-
judicial functions without losing Article III status. 109 Consequently, by as-
suming that the applicability of the statute to the District of Columbia courts
could be considered separately," 0 and by ignoring the possibility that Tide-
water had extended the O'Donoghue rationale to inferior federal courts
generally,:"' the Court of Appeals was enabled to hold that even if it were
unconstitutional for a Court of Customs and Patent Appeals judge to be as-
signed to any Article III court outside the District of Columbia, the statute
would nevertheless be constitutional in Lurk, which involved a court in the
District of Columbia. In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeals was
apparently undaunted by the fact that the statute in question does not once
distinguish the District of Columbia courts from the federal district and
circuit courts, and does not once mention them by name. The court relied,
rather, on the fact that the act being construed bad superseded an earlier
enactment providing that Court of Customs and Patent Appeals judges could
temporarily be assigned to the District of Columbia courts." 2 The fact that
this earlier act was in effect when the judge in question was appointed 113
seems to have been taken by the Court of Appeals as meaning that he was
from that time invested with sufficient tenure to sit on the District of Colum-
bia courts "i4-- a result which it reached by assuming, without examination,
that the O'Donoghue holding rendered the earlier act constitutional."i 0 By
107. The words are those of the plurality of Jackson, Black, and Burton, JJ.; see note
60 supra. Vinson, C.J., and Douglas, J., appeared to agree; see text at notes 61-63 supra.
108. 296 F.2d 360 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
109. See text at note 37 .npra.
110. 296 F.2d at 362.
111. See text at note 130 infra.
112. 28 U.S.C. § 22 (1934).
113. He was appointed in 1937.
114. 296 F.2d at 362.
115. Ibid.
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dint of some fairly prodigious statutory interpretation, then, the Court of
Appeals was able to avoid the substantial issues raised by the congressional
attempt to revoke the Bakelite bifurcation doctrine.1 " But it was able to do
this only at the expense of implicitly passing on the constitutionality of a
statute now defunct.
It was against this background of judicial legerdemain that Glidden Com-
pany, the defeated appellee in a recent Second Circuit case involving the
issue of shop-removals, devoted an entire page in its ten-page argument for
certiorari to the proposition that one of the judges sitting on the Court of
Appeals was a Court of Claims-and therefore a legislative-judge. 117 The
petition in question was submitted subsequent to the en banc decision by the
Court of Appeals in Lurk, and prior to the Supreme Court's grant of certi-
orari from that decision. The earlier remand in that case had demonstrated not
only that the Supreme Court did not regard the issues presented as spurious,""
but also that at least three Justices-of the four required-would approve
a petition for certiorari presenting such issues." 9 Furthermore, the en banc
decision in Lurk had indicated that that case might not provide an appropriate
vehicle for a comprehensive decision on the legislative-constitutional con-
troversy, because of the possibility that District of Columbia courts could be
distinguished from Article III courts generally. As a result, an informed
practitioner faced with the problem of obtaining a grant of certiorari in
Glidden would have been derelict in not including in his petition a reference
to the legislative-constitutional controversy, even in a case as rife with hotly
disputed substantive issues as was Glidden. By its action in Lurk, in other
words, the Supreme Court had to a large extent dictated the contents of the
petition for certiorari in the Glidden case, thus exercising what may perhaps
be described as one of its "Active Virtues."' 20
116. The circuit court refused even to decide whether the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals was legislative or constitutional. 296 F.2d at 362.
117. See notes 1-7 supra and accompanying text. The judge in question, Judge J. War-
ren Madden, wrote the majority opinion in the 2-1 decision.
118. This is apparent from the citation, in the remand order, of Ellis v. United States,
356 U.S. 674 (1958), holding that non-frivolous appeals in forma pauperis to U.S. Courts
of Appeals must be allowed. 366 U.S. 712 (1961).
119. Franfurter, Harlan, and Stewart, JJ.; see note 76 supra.
120. Cf. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40 (1961).
For a similar "virtue," which might properly be described as "hyperactive," see Pollak,
The Supreme Court and the States: Reflections on Boynton v. Virginia, 49 CALF. L. REv.
15, 21, 22 (1961), where it is shown that through an ex parte communication the Court
took the initiative "to shift the focus of a case to an issue not embraced within the 'questions
presented' by petitioner."
A second petition for certiorari was granted in the Lurk case, Oct. 9, 1961, and it was
docketed beside Glidden (30 U.S.L. WEEK 3113 and 3122). Oral argument was heard in
both cases on Feb. 21, 1962 (30 U.S.L. WEEK 3266, 3261-64).
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III
Doctrinally-at least prior to Williams and O'Donoghve-a constitutional
court was defined as a court vested with some part of "the judicial power
of the United States." A legislative court, on the other hand, was a court
which, though vested with powers, at least in part of a judicial nature, were
not part of "the judicial power of the United States." Such a legislative
court was a court created, or whose creation was authorized by the Congress
in the exercise of specific or general powers constitutionally granted to the
legislative department. A logical development of this bifurcation doctrine
would demand a complete separation of the two classes. Thus, only legislative
courts would be capable of hearing matters not within the purview of Article
III, while situations under that purview could be adjudicated only by con-
stitutional courts. Since Article III does not apply to territorial or other
legislative courts, the Congress would not constitutionally be inhibited from
changing the tenure of judges in such courts, even when an earlier Congress
had provided for them the same tenure as that given to constitutional judges.
It follows that legislative judges could not be assigned to constitutional courts,
because whatever the terms of their tenure, its basis would be statutory
rather than constitutional. Constitutional judges, qua judges, could not sit
on legislative courts, for this would widen the carefully delineated scope of
Article 111.121 There could, then, be no concurrent areas of jurisdiction. And,
since the same constitutional factors which deny original jurisdiction to a
court serve to deny it appellate jurisdiction, review of constitutional court
decisions could not be made by legislative courts, and review of legislative
court decisions could not be made by constitutional courts, including the
Supreme Court, except to the extent that the latter courts can review any
legislative or administrative proceeding. 1 22 Finally, in terms of such a doctrine,
the nature of a court would be determined solely by the nature of the func-
tions given to it by Congress, and it would therefore be irrelevant for classifica-
tion purposes whether the Congress had labeled it legislative or constitu-
tional.
123
Logical development, however, has not been carried to extremes, and there
has recently been a tendency to do away with the legislative-constitutional
distinction, as applied to existing courts, though the theoretical distinction
lingers on. Thus, the Court of Claims-held in Williams to be a legislative
court-has long shared a concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts. 124
The Supreme Court has long accepted appeals from the legislative courts, ex-
121. The argument has been made, however, that they might opt to sit as commis-
sioners; this suggestion, however, has met with relatively little success. See note 137 infra.
122. See generally Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review, 71 HARV. L. RZEv. 401, 769
(1958).
123. Cf. Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. at 459.
124. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
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cept in instances where the matters at issue fail to present "cases and con-
troversies.' 25 Furthermore, the Congress, at one point, attempted to declare
the Customs Court a constitutional court,126 while leaving the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals-which reviews the decisions of that court-a
legislative court. At least one judge of a territorial court has been called
upon to sit in a constitutional court.1,27 The territorial courts for the District
of Columbia, once regarded as unquestionably legislative,'12 were with no ap-
preciable intervening change in function declared by the Supreme Court to be
at least in some respects constitutional' 29 And as a result of Tidewater, the
District of Columbia Courts, formerly thought of as without a doubt constitu-
tional, now exercise by virtue of an act of Congress diversity jurisdiction of a
type which falls outside the purview of Article III.130
These failures in practice to implement the theoretical distinction may well
result from the expansion of the functions of the federal government. Thus, in
order to cope with a vast increase in legislative business, the Congress have
been forced to legislate more and more generally and to delegate much of the
work involved in the specific application of such general enactments to other,
more specialized, bodies, originally regarded as legislative or administrative in
nature. Over time the procedures developed by these agencies tend to become
increasingly formal. And the more firmly fixed such rules became, the more
the particular body in question comes to resemble a court of law. Thus, there
exist today many quasi-independent agencies and boards whose Mnodi operandi
seem, in varying degree, judicial. At what might be called the "judicial ex-
treme" of this group are the Tax Court, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, the Customs Court, and the Court of Claims. The functions per-
formed by these last, though not "inherently" judicial in the sense that they
were not exercised by courts "at common law,' 131 appear to be governed
by sufficiently formal frameworks to be denominated "courts." Indeed, the
125. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
Professor Moore would justify such concurrent jurisdiction, and appeals to the Supreme
Court, by finding that, though Article III is the sole source of federal judicial power, it
is not the sole source of congressional power to create courts. 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
71, 72 (2d. ed. 1961).
126. Act of July 14, 1956, ch. 589, 70 Stat. 532 (1956).
127. Irish v. United States, 225 F.2d 3 (9th Cir. 1955). The territorial judge in this
case, despite assertions to the contrary, see 69 HAgv. L. REv. 760 (1956), did not cast the
deciding vote.
128. See, e.g., Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 HARv. L. REv. 894 (1930).
129. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933).
130. If Justices Rutledge and Murphy were right in Tidewater, then, of course, the
jurisdiction would fall within Article III. See discussion at notes 66-67 supra.
131. This test was originated in Bakelite, 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
Functions similar to those of the Customs Court and Court of Claims, however, may have
been performed at an early period by the Court of the Exchequer; see, e.g., PLucic-
NETT, A CONCIsE HISTORY OF THE ComxmoN LAw 146, 147, 175 (1956).
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process described above recapitulates the mode of development of the original
common law courts in England at a time when the functions of that govern-
ment were likewise expanding.1 32 The Common Pleas and King's Bench were
specialized and regularized developments of the Curia Regis and the General
Eyres, which exercised undifferentiated functions of government, and the
Court of the Exchequer was the result of a gradual formalization of proceed-
ings before what began as essentially an accounting and taxing agency. In
the United States, furthermore, a conscious emulation of "true" courts,
particularly in later stages of the development of administrative bodies, has
accelerated the process.
Since the effect of such a development is to impose increasingly stringent
procedural limitations and thus to render less arbitrary the exercise of the
expanding powers of government, there would appear to be strong policy
reasons for encouraging it. Thus Professor J.W. Moore, for example, sug-
gests the expansion of what he terms the "hybrid" classification of the District
of Columbia courts to the Court of Claims, the Customs Court, and the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals. 133 These courts, he argues, like the District
of Columbia courts, seem to be permanent in character, and exercise an im-
portant jurisdiction. Their judges should therefore be given the independence
which comes from Article III tenure and should be integrated into the general
federal system for the assignment of judges. Furthermore, Professor M'Ioore
sees nothing inconsistent in allowing the Congress "sufficient freedom to re-
quire . . . [such courts] . . . to perform administrative or legislative func-
tions, or render advisory opinions."'134 Any such "hybrid" classification, how-
ever, insofar as it authorizes the performance of non-judicial functions, must
be inconsistent with the traditional view that Article III courts may be re-
quired to hear only "cases" and "controversies,"'13 5 as those constitutional
phrases have been construed in a series of decisions beginning in 1792.
From its first judicial exposition in Hayburn's Case,136 the case and con-
troversy doctrine has required that Article III courts review only those con-
crete disputes in which they can make a final decision, binding upon adversary
parties, and non-reviewable by other government departments. 137 As early
132. See, e.g., PLUCKNEIT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COImoN LAW 139-56
(1956).
133. 1 MoORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 0.4[4] (2d. ed. 1961).
134. Id. at 72.
135. And on this reasoning, the O'Donoghue result must also be inconsistent with the
traditional view, as are the dicta in Williams regarding the non-Article III nature of the
Tucker Act jurisdiction of the District Courts.
136. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792).
137. Hayburn's Case was a motion for a mandamus to compel the Circuit Court for the
District of Pennsylvania to consider a pension award to Hayburn, which the court had
refused to consider because it could be reconsidered by the Secretary [Act of March
23, 1792, 1 Stat. 243 (1792) ]. Other circuit courts also would not consider cases under
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as 1793, the Supreme Court refused to grant the request of the President
and Secretary of State for legal advice,138 and it has since refused to be
"deceived" by congressional attempts to frame requests for such advisory
opinions in the form of justiciable causes.139 Similarly, although the Court
has retreated from more extreme statements of the doctrine140 in order to
allow appeals from state 141 and federal declaratory judgments, 142 it still re-
quires a justiciable dispute to be "definite and concrete, touching the legal re-
lations of parties having adverse legal interests ... [and] ... admitting of
specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character .... ,43 Antiquity, how-
ever, is not alone sufficient to make a doctrine viable.144 Consequently, if the
the act, but agreed to adjourn and consider the cases as commissioners, see Hayburn's
Case, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 408, 410; United State v. Yale Todd (1794), reported in a note to
United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 39, 51-53 (1851). Yale Todd held that such
a sitting as commissioners by the Circuit Court for the District of Connecticut violated the
statute, but did not reach the question whether it would violate the Constitution: A question
which dictum in Ferreira resolved against the validity of the practices. Hayburn's Case was
taken under advisement by the Court, but the offending statute being repealed and replaced
by another means of relief for Hayburn [see Act of February 28, 1793, 1 Stat. 324 (1793) ], a
decision was never handed down.
138. Letter by Chief Justice Jay and Associate Justices to President Washington, dated
August 8, 1793, in reply to Letter by Thomas Jefferson to Chief Justice Jay and Associate
Justices, dated July 18, 1793. 3 CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 486.
139. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). In that case, the Congress had
passed a bill granting jurisdiction to the Court of Claims and Supreme Court on appeal, to
hear the named parties plaintiff, with the United States to pay their expenses from a trust
fund if the acts of Congress they contested were found unconstitutional. The Court held
that jurisdiction was lacking in the Supreme Court because of lack of a bona fide case or
controversy, and in the Court of Claims because the act giving the two courts jurisdiction
was not separable. The very inarticulateness of the Muskrat decision in attempting to
explain why that situation was not cognizable by the Court is an indication of the great
importance the Court attaches to safeguarding its status vis-a-vis the other branches of
the federal government. Muskrat may be said to stand for the proposition that the Court
will not act at the specific behest of the Congress, and thus abandon part of its freedom not
to decide inopportune questions. See generally Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75
HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). Professor Bickel notes two of the most important aspects of
Muskrat: it was thoroughly concrete and adversary, despite the Court's contentions, and
it is frequently cited with approval. Id. at 45 and n.25.
140. See Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 76 (1927), where the Court
said it was "beyond the constitutional limitations" upon federal courts for a district court
to hear a declaratory judgment action; and Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n., 277
U.S. 274, 289-90 (1928), where the Court held a suit "in the nature of a suit to remove a
cloud from title" to be "not a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III .... [be-
cause] [r]esort to equity to remove such doubts is a proceeding which was unknown to
either English or American courts at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
141. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933).
142. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
143. Id. at 240-41.
144. Cf. the oral argument in Lurk in its second appearance before the Supreme Court:
Mr. Gressman concluded his argument by saying that the Supreme Court has
1962]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
continued existence of the constitutional-legislative distinction is to be based
upon the importance of preserving the "case and controversy" limitations
embodied in Article 111,145 it becomes necessary to examine the purposes
served by these limitations.
Article III creates a Supreme Court which, as a result of the doctrines
announced in Marbury v. Madison, has emerged as the final authority for the
construction of the federal constitution. But as that very case announced, this
ultimate power is reserved for use only in "cases" and "controversies."'14 As
the member of the institutional triumvirate ruling the nation which is by far
the weakest in terms of direct power and control over physical resources,
yet which constitutionally is required to assert superior authority over its co-
rulers to construe the Constitution and to judge their actions under it, the
Court must continually guard against being brought under the control of more
powerful departments. And because the Court is itself the ultimate arbiter of
the content to be poured into the phrases of Article III, strict adherence to
those limitations constitutes the means by which it contrives to control the tim-
ing and scope of its own participation in the processes of government. Viewed in
this light, the refusal of the Supreme Court to abandon the constitutional-legisla-
tive distinction represents an unwillingness to permit congressional assumption
of powers over the Court's jurisdiction greater than those which have heretofore
been exercised or considered granted to the legislature under the terms of Arti-
cle III. Thus, "case and controversy" serves, along with doctrines of standing,
political questions, ripeness, the "substantiality" of federal questions on appeal,
and certiorari discretion, as a means by which to avoid the decision of ques-
tions which are not properly presented in a particular case, or whose decision
at a particular time might involve such far-reaching consequences as danger-
ously to deplete the reservoir of public respect and good will upon which the
Court must ultimately depend for its continued independent status. 4 7 These
doctrines permit the Court to assert great authority over crucial questions by
reserving to that body itself the decision as to the proper moment for action.
And similar reasons would appear fully to justify the Court's adamant re-
fusal in Gordon to render decisions whose execution would be subject to the
approval of other government departments.
from 'time immemorial recognized the distinction between Article I and Article III
courts.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter: "You know what I think about that argument. It is the
same as arguing how many angels can dance on the head of a pin."
30 U.S.L. WEEK at 3263.
145. These limitations formed the basis for the never overruled case of Gordon
(see note 19 supra and accompanying text) ; and were also basic to three of the opinions
written in the Tidewater case. See text at notes 61-63 supra.
146. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
147. See generally Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, HAv. L. Rav. 40 (1961).
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Given the obvious importance of permitting the Congress sufficient flexibility
to make possible the most efficient utilization of the lower federal judiciary
as a whole, 4 s the argument in favor of retention of the constitutional-legisla-
tive distinction would appear to be considerably weaker with regard to the
lower federal courts than with regard to the Supreme Court, at least if
all the lower court judges were granted life tenure and salaries not sub-
ject to diminution. In setting forth case and controversy limitations, how-
ever, section 2 of Article III speaks in general terms, making no differentia-
tion between the definition of cases and controversies for the Supreme Court
and for those inferior federal courts which the Congress might create. It
might be assumed, therefore, that such limitations must be applied to all
Article III courts uniformly. As Chief Justice Marshall noted, however,
"[W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding."'1 49 It
was presumably his appreciation of this fact which enabled Marshall in Amer-
ican Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton: Canter to lay the basis for the constitu-
tional-legislative distinction by his discovery of legislative courts. 50 And
a principle which permitted that discovery must surely also be capable of
authorizing differential treatment for the Supreme Court and inferior federal
courts if sufficient reasons of policy so dictate.' 5 ' It would appear to be
necessary, therefore, to examine the extent to which considerations which
militate in favor of the preservation of Article III limitations in the case
of the Supreme Court apply to lower federal courts as well.
The nature of the work done by the lower federal courts is, of course,
different not only in degree, but in kind from that done by the Supreme Court.
The lower courts are not the final arbiters of the Constitution. And such courts
already exercise jurisdiction over matters such as naturalization and
bankruptcy, l0 in which the traditional elements of a case or controversy might
at times not appear. Moreover, while congressional forcing of a decision from
the Supreme Court at an inopportune time might well tend to reduce the
independence of the Court, 54 it is difficult to see how any congressional ex-
148. See, e.g., 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricE 73 (2d ed. 1961).
149. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
150. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
151. For such differential treatment see generally Hart, The Power of Congress to
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HA v. L. REv. 1362
(1953). For an attempt to ground at least a portion of the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction directly in Article III, rather than subject to control by the Congress, see id.
at 1363-65.
152. For a valiant attempt to bring such proceedings within the traditional scope of
"case" or "controversy," see Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568 (1926).
153. The plurality in Tidewater attempted to demonstrate that bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion was outside the Article III grant of judicial power, and that, therefore, the U.S. Courts
-necessarily including the Supreme Court-had long been functioning as legislative courts.
337 U.S. at 594-600.
154. See generally text at notes 146-47 supra.
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pansion of justiciable controversies in the lower courts-even requiring
opinions subject to review by other departments of the government 15--would
significantly alter the constitutional balance of power between the judiciary
and a legislature which already possesses the constitutional power to abolish
all such courts. 56 Given the relatively limited present utilization of the
potential jurisdiction of the lower federal courts-witness the infrequent em-
ployment of the "advisory" jurisdiction of the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals 157 -and the ease with which inroads may be made upon historically
permissible categories of cases and controversies through the doctrine of
legislative courts, 58 it appears unlikely that an explicit expansion of justici-
able situations will necessarily result in any significant increase in the work
assigned by the Congress to the courts. More likely, the consequences would
be confined to a greater congressional flexibility in deciding what court is
most convenient for adjudicating a particular class of extant disputes.
Furthermore, of all the aspects of the case and controversy requirement
created by the Supreme Court, the one limiting jurisdiction to those disputes
not subject to review by other branches of the government is the least definite
and the one most uniquely applicable to the Supreme Court alone. The dif-
ference between cases which will or will not be heard in an Article III court
on this ground is, of course, one of degree; for all judgments may require
some modicum of extra-judicial "review" before they become final, even if
such review involves no more than a decision whether or not to enforce a
judgment running against a private party, or to comply with a judgment
running against some other branch of government. The history of Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction over the Court of Claims illustrates the effect on
the Court of a small change in the degree of extra-judicial control. In Gordon
v. United States, 59 the Supreme Court held that it was without jurisdiction
155. Thus, despite the congressional declaration that the Court of Claims is a constitu-
tional court, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1492, 2509 (1958), permits the Congress or either house to
refer bills to the Court of Claims on the subject matter of which that court would have
jurisdiction, to render an opinion to the referring body. Such provisions have been extant
throughout the history of the Court of Claims.
By Act of July 28,1953, ch. 253, § 11, 67 Stat. 226 (1953), however, the Congress abolish-
ed the former requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 2510 (1948) that the court give a similar kind of
advisory opinions also to the heads of the executive departments upon request.
156. In his letter to President Washington declining on behalf of the Court to render
advisory opinions to the Executive Department (note 138 supra), Chief Justice Jay gave
two reasons for the refusal: "[The three departments of the government] being in certain
respects checks upon each other, and our being judges of a court in the last resort,... afford
strong arguments against the propriety of our extra-judicially deciding the questions .... .
(Emphasis added). Similarly, although Hayburn's Case involved a Circuit Court, two
of the three judges were Supreme Court Justices sitting on circuit.
157. See Comment, The Distinction Between Legislative and Constitutional Courts
and Its Effect on Judicial Assignment, 62 CoLum. L. REv. 133, 163-64 and n.196 (1962).
158. See National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949);
text at note 130 supra.
159. 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1865) ; 117 U.S. 697 (Appendix) (1886). See generally
notes 18-22 supra and accompanying text.
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to hear appeals from the Court of Claims, since the judgments of that court
had to be satisfied by congressional appropriations on motion of the Secretary
of the Treasury. Shortly after Gordon, however, the Court quietly accepted
appellate jurisdiction over the Court of Claims 160 although the amended
statute still provided that judgments had to be paid out of congressional ap-
propriations; the only difference was that at the time of Gordon the judg-
ments had to be "estimated for" by the Secretary before they could be dis-
bursed, while subsequent to the post-Gordon amendment 161 the judgments
could be paid directly out of a general appropriation for satisfaction of Court
of Claims judgments. Although the theoretical possibility of legislative control
remained the same under both statutes, the Supreme Court was obviously con-
vinced that the real likelihood of control was decreased under the amended
statute and therefore that the fears generally accompanying extra-judicial re-
view were too insubstantial to counsel against the acceptance of jurisdiction
in that class of cases. The factors which motivate decision on whether or not to
accept cases subject to some such review include the prestige of the Supreme
Court and the on-going balance of powers in our tripartite system. And the
elements composing these factors are in a constant flux. A delicate determina-
tion that the acceptance of a given type of case at a given time by the Supreme
Court will be deleterious to these values will in most cases be wholly inap-
plicable to lower federal courts. If the lower federal courts, therefore, are to
be foreclosed from rendering judgments solely because such judgments may,
in some degree, be subject to review by other branches of the government,
an independent policy basis for this jurisdictional limitation would be re-
quired. This basis, however, is conspicuously absent in most cases.
1 62
160. De Groot v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 419 (1867).
161. Act of March 17, 1866, 14 Stat. 9 (1866), repealing § 14 of the Act of March 3,
1863, 12 Stat. 768 (1863).
162. It is not meant to imply that Article III limitations are wholly inapplicable to the
lower federal courts; what is argued for is, simply, a more permissive interpretation of the
finality requirement as applied to them. Thus, a statute requiring or permitting even the
lower federal courts to render purely advisory opinions on general questions of law un-
connected with a specific dispute between adversary parties should probably be held un-
constitutional upon a functional analysis of the relative roles of the judiciary and the legisla-
ture in a democratic society. See generally Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV.
L. REv. at 74-79.
Moreover, even if Article III limitations were held not to apply, elements of the case and
controversy doctrine are derived directly from the common law, see e.g., the discussion in
Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 705-06 (1886), and such limitations could presum-
ably be applied even in the absence of constitutional prohibitions. For an analogous situa-
tion, see the status accorded declaratory judgments in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300
U.S. 227 (1937).
Similarly it is unlikely that a lower federal court could be required to render such a
purely advisory opinion in circumstances which amounted to an unlawful delegation of
legislative powers. The line, however, may be difficult to draw. Thus, even today courts
administer statutes which might well be held void on delegation grounds if directed to ad-
ministrative agencies, See e.g., the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 Stat. 209, ch. 647 (1890), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-17 (1958).
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In the case of the District of Columbia courts, moreover, a parsing of the
Keller and O'Donoghue decisions suggests that the rationale of dual power
would already permit the Congress to require inferior federal courts located
there to render opinions subject to non-judicial review.16 3 Continued ad-
herence, therefore, to the doctrine that lower federal courts located elsewhere
cannot be required to deliver such opinions appears to represent a purely
formal restriction on the effective powers of the Congress.1 4 Moreover, it
would appear to be somewhat late in the day-given the dicta in Williams ' 5
and the result in Tidewater '6 -to argue that Article III courts are incapable
of receiving jurisdiction over non-Article III "cases and controversies."'
01 1
The gloss upon O'Donoghue provided by the plurality in Tidewater sug-
gests that any powers the Congress may have over the jurisdiction of the District
of Columbia courts extend to lower federal courts generally. 168 Thus,
the reasoning of the Tidewater plurality would permit the lower federal
courts to render decisions subject to review by other departments on the
ground that the questions presented are ones of "mere mechanics of govern-
ment and administration."'169 The question as to whether or not the Supreme
Court may be required to hear appeals from decisions by such courts in non-
Article III cases and controversies should, however, be a separable one,
170
163. See 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 72 (2d ed. 1961).
164. The extent to which such a limitation would be solely conceptual becomes even
more apparent when it is realized that judges from the District are reciprocally interchange-
able on a temporary basis with other members of the lower federal judiciary; this inter-
changeability would appear, after O'Donoghue, to be constitutionally unassailable.
165. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
166. See text at notes 52-70 supra.
167. Although non-diversity jurisdiction over cases involving state-created rights
would represent a considerably greater departure for the lower federal courts, the result,
and the plurality rationale in Tidewater-upholding a grant of jurisdiction over state created
rights in matters which fall without the boundaries of Article III diversity jurisdiction-
might well be read to authorize suits in federal courts on state created rights even between
citizens of the same state, for if constitutional strictures regarding the scope of the federal
judicial power do not apply to legislative courts, and to the Congress in creating them, such
a result would be quite possible. But see Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 546, stating that
within the states only courts created pursuant to Article III can exercise admiralty
jurisdiction (and so presumably all Article III judicial powers).
Given the radical nature of such an innovation, however, it must be recalled that there
was no single majority holding in Tidewater and that the Act there at issue could also have
been held constitutionally valid-as Justices Rutledge and Murphy attempted to do-by
overruling an earlier case which had held the District of Columbia not a state for purposes
of Article III diversity jurisdiction. But see the way in which the Courts of Appeals have
used the result in Tidewater to allow diversity jurisdiction over territorial citizens in the
federal courts (see note 70 supra), which seems to imply that they at least lean toward the
permissive view expressed by the plurality of three in Tidewater.
168. See text at note 59 supra.
169. 337 U.S. at 585.
170. Cf. De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303 (1906), for a similar view on
separability expressed by the Supreme Court, for the purpose of allowing it to review a
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and one which might well be answered in the negative.17 1 But so long as
that question is regarded as separable there would appear to be no need
for a conceptual category of "legislative courts," and no justification for deny-
ing constitutional life tenure to judges simply because they consider matters
which the Supreme Court deems it unwise to review.
The confusion apparent in cases exploring the constitutional-legislative
distinction is explicable, therefore, without resort to the theory, certainly color-
able from the opinions, that such decisions represent a sort of judicial Laocoin,
with the Court enmeshed in the doctrinal convolutions of an archaic fiction which
fails to serve any valid function. It would appear, rather, that the Supreme
Court's focus on the question of construing Article III so as to maintain its
own independence, itself scantly articulated for the very political reasons which
impel it, has obscured the issue of the relevence of the Article III limitations
to the lower federal courts which only partially share the Supreme Court's
status as a governmental department with responsibilities and duties
coequal with those of the Congress.1"2 There is no need to hamstring the lower
federal courts by making them the battleground for the independence of the
Supreme Court, nor to run the consequent risk of compromising the Court's
independence by the admission that the Congress must be permitted a certain
flexibility in organizing those inferior courts. In most instances, the Congress
probably will find it expedient to continue to limit jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts to matters traditionally judicial. But this should not preclude the
use of the judiciary in other, related ways. Rather, once the essential difference
between the Supreme Court and the inferior courts is appreciated, it should
become possible for the Supreme Court to allow the Congress a good deal of free-
dom with respect to the latter without subjecting itself to congressional control.
IV
An important preliminary question suggested by the Glidden and Lurk
appeals is whether, assuming the judge to be sitting unconstitutionally, it is
open to a party to attack the decision upon that ground alone, without showing
any specific error or prejudice. It has been maintained in a commentary 173
upon the closely analogous situation of a territorial judge sitting on a court
divorce action despite the fact that such actions were not allowed in lower federal courts
within the states because of the lack of a dispute falling under Article III.
This would have relieved Justice Jackson of a troublesome problem; at 337 U.S. 600 n.24
he states,
No question has been raised here as to the source of this Court's appellate jurisdic-
tion over such cases. Nor do we see how that issue could be raised without challeng-
ing our past and present exercise of jurisdiction over cases adjudicated in the
district courts and in the Court of Claims, solely under the Tucker Act....
171. See text at note 146 supra.
172. See generally text at notes 146-53 supra.
173. 69 HAv. L. REv. 760 (1956).
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of appeals,174 that the only way in which the authority of the judge could
be questioned would be in a quo warranto proceeding initiated by the United
States Attorney. 75 The doctrinal basis for this position is that the judge is at
least a de facto judge, and that if no injustice can be shown to have occurred,
only the sovereign is injured by, and may complain of, the judge's usurpa-
tion.176 The policy the doctrine is designed to serve is the stability of judg-
ments; without it the omission of a technicality in a judicial appointment
would overthrow not only the judgment complained of, but all previous judg-
ments, complained of or not, handed down by the improperly constituted
court.1 7 7 Thus, the Supreme Court has refused to void the judgment of a
lower court despite valid technical arguments regarding term time. 78 But
the de facto doctrine was developed at common law, where there were no consti-
tutional safeguards regarding judicial appointments, and-whatever its validity
under such circumstances-it would today seem indeed ironic if the constitu-
tional prescriptions designed to insure an independent and impartial judiciary
could not be invoked by the very litigants they were designed to protect.
Furthermore, the recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. Anteri-
an-Foreign S.S. Corp.179 would appear considerably to have weakened the
impact of the de facto court doctrine. In that case, an en banc determination
by the circuit court was reversed because of the presence, contrary to
statute, 8 0 of a retired judge. Since, however, as noted in Justice Harlan's
dissent,'18 the opinion carefully avoided construing the statute in question so
as to afford the litigant a personal right, it leaves open-in terms of the Lurk
and Glidden appeals-the question whether the defendants in those cases
may claim a constitutionally protected right to a judge with life tenure
and an undiminishable salary.
174. Irish v. United States, 225 F.2d 3 (9th Cir. 1955).
1,75. Quo warranto proceedings traditionally were criminal in form. HIGH, EXTRA-
ORDINARY LEGAL REmEDIES § 591 (1874). Though today they seem to be civil, at least for
purposes of removal to federal courts, Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449 (1884), it is not to be
supposed that a District Attorney would be eager to institute them against a judge.
It is perhaps worth noting that, at common law, quo warranto would probably have been
available to a party through the fiction of suing the judge "on behalf of" the king. BRACroN's
NOr BOOK 35 (1219), 1175 (1236-7), 1181 (1236-7); cited in PLUcKNET , LEGISLA-
TION OF EDWARD I at 35-36. And in some states today similar actions may be brought by
individuals.
176. See generally, e.g., PowicKE, THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 376-379 (1953).
177. See, e.g., Howell v. Howell, 213 Ark. 298, 208 S.W.2d 22 (1948), noted, 46 MICH.
L. Rrv. 1124 (1948), which invalidated over 1,000 divorce decrees.
178. Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118 (1891) (reversed on other grounds). There is
dictum to this effect in McDowell v. United States, 159 U.S. 596, 601-02 (1895).
179. 363 U.S. 685 (1960).
180. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1958).
181. 363 U.S. at 695, 696.
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In a recent district court case involving this question, United States v.
Starling,82 the constitutionality of part of the Alaskan Statehood Act was
challenged. The act purported to continue the District Court for the Terri-
tory of Alaska, with its bench of judges who sat for four year terms, for
a period of up to three years after statehood. Litigants in two criminal and
two civil cases pending before the court moved to dismiss on the ground
that since Alaska had been admitted into the Union, the territorial court,
despite the act, no longer had jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters
arising under the laws of the United States. They alleged three grounds for
the unconstitutionality of the act extending the court: that it violated the
tenure for good behavior provision of Article III, section 2; that it denied
them as Alaskans the privileges and immunities accorded to the citizens of
the other states by Article IV, section 2; and that denial of a judge with
life tenure deprived them of due process of law as guaranteed in the Fifth
Amendment.
Exemplifying his dictum that "[W] hen faced with obstacles Alaskans have
never been dismayed,'1 33 Judge McCarrey managed to make the law accord
with the Constitution by finding the Territorial District Court operating in the
state of Alaska to be a valid legislative court.18 4 The judge (who himself had
a four year term) found that the right to a judge with life tenure was not
sufficiently significant to rise to the status of a due process requisite. 85 Ap-
parently, indeed, the judge failed to recognize even the existence of such a
right, for the equal protection argument urged by plaintiffs was disposed of
on the ground that "a federal judge in Alaska who does not hold life tenure
during Alaska's transitional period is not 'substantially and fundamentally dif-
ferent' from his counterparts [i.e., federal judges] in the other states."'8 8s
Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. v.
Bornbolis,'87 the judge reasoned that "[i]f the federal government can delegate
all its judicial power to a state court, it should certainly be able to do the same
to a federal legislative court, namely, to the District Court for the District
of Alaska ... such court having slight differences, if any, from an ordinary
federal court.'
188
In Bornbolis, the trial of a federally created right under FELA in a state
court was held not to be subject to the jury trial requirement of the Seventh
Amendment.189 And such a holding would seem equally applicable in Glidden,
182. 171 F. Supp. 47 (D. Alaska, 1959).
183. Id. at 56.
184. Id. at 66.
185. Id. at 63.
186. Id. at 65.
187. 241U.S.211 (1916).
188. 171 F. Supp. at 66.
189. Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Bonbolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916).
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in which federal jurisdiction was founded upon diversity of citizenship. 10°
Furthermore, whereas the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial is ex-
pressly conferred upon litigants, the tenure provisions in Article III can
be read to relate solely to the distribution of powers within the federal
government, thus creating personal rights only in judges rather than litigants.
And such a reading of Article III would be bolstered by the fact that trials
in federal courts may be presided over by interim judges, who would not only
lack life tenure, but might not receive any salary at all if not confirmed. 91
But whether or not the right to be tried before a judge with constitutional
tenure is considered inconsequential when viewed in the abstract-as it ap-
parently was in Starling ig-2-this right, like the twenty dollar lower limit
on civil jury trials, 193 the right to grand jury indictment, 94 and the right to be
tried in the state and previously ascertained district wherein an alleged crime
shall have been committed, 95 is embodied in the basic law of the land. And
since the holding in Bombolis has not eliminated the Seventh Amendment re-
quirement in federal courts,' 9 6 there is no reason to assume that lack of a
right to judges with Article III tenure in state courts should alter any rights
which a litigant such as Glidden might have in federal courts. Furthermore,
the possibility of an interim judge need not militate against such a right, since
Article III could also be construed to give a right to a judge with constitu-
tional tenure in all cases except for interim appointments which are specifical-
ly provided for in the Constitution.
197
Even if Article III is held not to give civil litigants rights to a judge with
tenure, however, the result might differ in a criminal case. Assuming the
proposition that the Congress could vest jurisdiction of federal crimes in
state courts,198 there are grounds for believing that the reasoning of the
190. Glidden was removed to the federal District Court from the New York Supreme
Court. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F2d 99 (1961).
191. 5 U.S.C. § 56 (1958). See note 197 infra.
192. See notes 185-86 supra and accompanying text.
193. U.S. CoNsT., amend. VII.
194. U.S. CoNsT., amend. V.
195. U.S. CoNsT., art. III, § 2 (cl. 3) ; amend. VI.
196. Indeed, federal procedure will apply even as to a state-created right tried in a
federal court, and even in the absence of a federal statute overriding the state procedure, and
even, despite Erie R-R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), where the state procedural
practice is of some importance to the determination of the case. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Elec. Co-op, 356 U.S. 525 (1958) ; Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960).
197. "The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during
the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their
next Session." U.S. CoNsT., art. II, § 2 (cl. 3). See United States v. Allocco, (S.D.N.Y.,
filed Dec. 1, 1961, No. 27324). To be sure, the words of the Constitution do not provide in
explicit terms that recess appointmentees shall sit before they are confirmed. But what else
could the words mean?
198. Cf. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), holding that the state courts of Rhode
Island must enforce penal provisions of the Federal Emergency Price Control Act.
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Bonibolis case would not be extended, and that in the exercise of such
jurisdiction the state courts would have to accord the accused constitutionally
guaranteed procedural rights, such as the Article III, section 2 and Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial.10 9 Given the present-day priority of per-
sonal over property rights,200 furthermore, the Court might well distinguish
between civil and criminal cases even in connection with the right to a judge
with tenure.20 1 The practical reasons for such a distinction are clear. In most
civil cases-and especially in those between private parties-lack of life
tenure is less apt to affect the impartiality of the judge than in criminal cases,
where the government is always a party,20 2 and where popular emotions are
more apt to assume significant proportions.
Because Benny Lurk committed his robbery in the District of Columbia, his
trial could not be held in a state court, and his rights under the federal
constitution were therefore vouchsafed him. But it seems absurd to give those
accused of federal crimes in the District of Columbia superior rights to those
accused of federal crimes in the several states, in whose interest, if in any
litigant's interests, the constitutional safeguards were established.20 3 Finally,
the result of finding a right for criminal but not for civil litigants, in constitu-
tional words which seem to apply generally, 2°4 seems no more anomalous than
the result achieved by Bombolis of finding rights for litigants in federal courts
in both state and federal causes of action, but not for litigants in state courts
even in federal causes of action, in words which seem to be equally general.
205
Even in connection with civil litigants, however, the question of a constitu-
tional right to a judge with Article III tenure is certainly not foreclosed. All
lower federal courts are created by the Congress. And it seems difficult to
argue that even the Keller case-which established the doctrine of Article I
congressional power over District of Columbia courts 20 0-- should be read to
have freed the Congress from constitutional strictures; just as the plenary
199. See text at notes 210-17 infra.
200. Compare Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), wvith SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194 (1947).
201. Cf. U.S. v. Starling, 171 F. Supp. at 66.
202. The government is likewise always a party in the Customs Court, Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, Court of Claims, and the Tax Court providing a similar justification
for requiring judges in those courts to have life tenure.
203. But cf. the plurality view in Tidewater, note 59 supra and accompanying text;
and the O'Donoghue argument, note 35 supra and accompanying text. If the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment incorporates equal protection prohibitions, however, see
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), then acceptance of the Tidewater and O'Donoghue
rationales might be held to deny equal protection under the laws to citizens of the several
states. See note 59 supra and the discussion of United States v. Starling at notes 182-88 supra.
204. U.S. CoNsT., art. III, § 1.
205. U.S. CONST., amend. VII.
206. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
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power of a state legislature over its judicial system is bounded by the limits of
the state constitution, so the Congress-when they create federal nisi prius
bodies 2 07 -should be held to the limitations of the national constitution.
Cohens v. Virginia 208 and at least five Justices in Tidewater 20 9 would apply
this test even where the Congress legislates for the District. A fortiori such
limitations should be held to apply whenever the Congress creates courts
which are national in scope.
It seems important to note, in this connection, that Justice Jackson, writing
for the plurality of three in Tidewater, carefully pointed out that fundamental
rights of litigants were not involved in that case.2 10 Rather, what was involved
both in Tidewater and in Keller was the permissible scope of congressional
power over the lower federal courts. And in O'Donoghue-in which litigants'
rights formed an explicit ground for decision 2 1 -a widened scope in terms of
functions was accompanied by a continuation of constitutionally guaranteed
rights.212 Support for a constitutional right to be tried by a judge with tenure
may also be gleaned from the continued expansion of procedural rights in
analogous areas. Thus, on the basis that the proceedings objected to would
deny petitioners such constitutional rights as grand jury indictment, jury
trial, and a judge with life tenure, the Supreme Court, in Toth v. Quarles 2 13
and Reid v. Covert 214 refused to permit the extension of court-martial juris-
diction over discharged military personnel and over civilians accompanying
military forces overseas. Similarly, the landmark case of Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath 215 embodies a quasi-constitutional interpretation of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act 216 which may well result in the application of continually
expanding procedural safeguards to the administrative process .2 1
207. This is the distinction upon which the difference between constitutional tenure and
lesser tenures should rest. When the whole case can be brought de novo in a higher court,
there is no reason for finding that Article III judicial power is vested in Justice-of-the-
Peace courts, police courts, small claims courts, etc. See Comment, The Distinction
Between Legislative and Constitutional Courts and Its Effect on Judicial Assignment, 62
COLUm. L. REv. 133, 152-53 (1962).
208. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 421 (1821). But cf. American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of
Cotton: Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1829), the case which began the legislative-constitu-
tional distinction. Chief Justice Marshall wrote both opinions.
209. The argument made against the assumption that the Congress could provide
nationwide service of process in the Tidewater situation was that the Congress-in legislat-
ing for the District of Columbia-was dealing with essentially local matters. This both the
plurality of three and Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Douglas vigorously denied. 337 U.S.
at 600-01, 623.
210. 337 U.S. at 585.
211. See text at notes 35-39 supra.
212. Ibid.
213. 350 U.S. 11, 17-19 (1955).
214. 354 U.S. 1,21, 36 (1957).
215. 339U.S. 33 (1950).
216. 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
217. See generally Comment, Deportation and Exclusion: A Continuing Dialogue
Between Congress and the Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 760 (1962).
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BIFURCATION
The Constitution contains a complex of rights accorded those who appear
before "courts." While these rights are not readily applicable to bodies exercis-
ing legislative or executive discretion, they become increasingly possible of
effective application as the body's rules of procedure become increasingly
formalized. The argument presented here is that as each of these constitutional
rights accorded litigants becomes possible of ready application, 218 the body
involved should in that respect be regarded as an Article III court. This is
not meant to imply that under such a view the Congress could create administra-
tive review bodies-such as the Interstate Commerce Commission-only under
the wegis of Article III. Rather, what is suggested is simply that such bodies will
-either through legislative mandate or through internal development-come
to apply an increasingly definite complex of general rules to the succession of
specific controversies coming before them.219 And as they do, increasing
weight will be accorded to their findings in specific cases by other govern-
mental bodies, including the courts, and so their decisions will become increas-
ingly less open to review.
220
The process described above-paralleling the English experience in the
common law courts 22 1-is, of course, the growth of the rule of law. And just
as the line between constitutional and legislative should not be used hamstring
congressional control over the lower federal courts,222 so that boundary should
not be regarded as a barrier to the assertion of a litigant's constitutional rights.
If Article III cases and controversies constitute too narrow a specification to
encompass all the manifold judicial duties of a modern government, those
categories must be thus far inadequate as a measure of the scope of constitu-
218. See e.g., discussion in text concerning the present ease of application of Article
III tenure to judges of territorial courts, at notes 15-17 mrpra.
219. Thus, in the oral argument of the Lurk case in its second appearance before the
Supreme Court, Justice Black enquired, "How are proceedings before the I.C.C. any less
judicial than before this Court? Is a reparation suit judicial in nature? What is left out?"
30 U.S.L. WEEK at 3262,3263.
220. Compare United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905), with Chin Yow v. United
States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908). See also Heady & Linenthal, Congress and Administrative
Regulation, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 238 (1961) ; Davis, Requirement of a Trial-Type
Hearing, 70 H.Av. L. REV. 193 (1956); DAvis, ADmiN'STRATnM LAw TREATISE § 7.10
(1958) ; ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COIITrEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
REPORT ON THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (1940) ; Gellhorn, Symposium
on Procedural Administrative Law: Introduction, 25 IOwA L. REV. 421 (1940) ; Hankins,
The Necessity for Notice and Hearing, 25 IowA L. REv. 457 (1940) ; McMahon, The Ordeal
of Administrative Law, 25 IOwA L. REv. 425 (1940) ; McGuire, Current Administrative Law
Proposals, 3 FED. B.J. 239 (1938).
The process, furthermore, is self-reinforcing, for the time and expense incurred in deter-
mining matters in bodies with complex and formalized procedures will discourage a com-
pletely new review.
221. See text at note 132 supra.
222. See text notes 152-58 supra.
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tional rights. Whether Congress declare a court constitutional or legislative,
in short, it is an inferior federal court. And as it develops increasingly
judicialized procedures for application to specific controversies, the procedural
rights vouchsafed to the litigant by the federal constitution must begin to
apply. To hold otherwise would be to deprive citizens of a safeguard made in-
creasingly necessary by an equally increasingly necessary expansion of govern-
ment services.
